

The Limits of Authoritarian Rule at the Periphery: The PIDE, the American Airbase, and Social Control on Terceira Island, Azores, 1954–1962

Abstract

In 1954, the Portuguese political police (*Polícia Internacional e da Defesa do Estado*: PIDE) created posts in the Azores island of Terceira, with a view to detecting activists against the authoritarian Portuguese regime and strengthening control over a part of the remote archipelago in the Atlantic. The PIDE agents were entering a difficult setting. The local elites and regular police units, and the Portuguese army units in the island, were far from delighted to have to work with the repressive arm of the regime. Exiles and opposition sympathizers from the mainland who lived in the Azores sometimes had a good reputation locally and enjoyed the support of the islanders and the regional elite. This situation created frustration and scorn in the ranks of the police.

But Terceira was not only an example of a peripheral zone of a Southern European authoritarian state but also the location of one of the most essential US airbases of the Cold War, on the Lajes Airfield. The massive US troop presence complicated the task of the PIDE agents. It led to questions of access for controlling potential opponents of the regime inside the base, but it also led to a whole range of conflicts and worries about the “Americanization” of the island and (from the point of view of regime hardliners) unwanted cultural exchange. This article analyzes the complex interactions through the interpretation of the formerly unknown PIDE series on Angra do Heroísmo (the island capital) and US American documentation on the Azores from the NARA.

Introduction

The year 1961 was a crucial one for the Portuguese authoritarian state (the *Estado Novo* or New State), with the outbreak of anticolonial rebellion in Angola and an abortive attempt at a coup d'état in the metropole.¹ The cracks within the regime were significant at that point. Not only did the revolt in Africa confirm the widespread discontent of local populations that were no longer willing to accept the repressive conditions of Portuguese rule and the lack of any prospect of autonomy and decolonization for the colonized, it also pointed

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to the inefficiency of the structures of repression installed in the empire, namely the service of the political police, the *Polícia Internacional e da Defesa do Estado* (PIDE).²

The events of 1961 made the agents of the political police very nervous, and that was the case not only in the administrative posts in the African territories but also at the margins of the Portuguese metropole, in the Atlantic islands belonging to Portugal. Seven years earlier, in 1954, leading officials of the PIDE had been optimistic that the new presence of the political police in all parts of the archipelago would lead to a crackdown on any opposition in the Azores. Between 1954 and 1961, however, the project to establish three PIDE posts on the islands—which were to replace the earlier, rudimentary Ponta Delgada post—provoked very particular challenges and difficulties. Terceira Island was, for its various and specific characteristics, the place where these difficulties can best be analyzed as an entangled social history. They also had the strongest impact on an important asset of Portugal's transatlantic relations: the relationship with the United States, due to the massive US military presence in Lajes Airbase, a principal strategic point of the Cold War.³ Therefore, a study of repression in Terceira and its limits also presents elements of cultural exchange and arrangements between the US presence, local elites—both descendants of Azorean families and former exiles—and groups that were more humble in socioeconomic terms; both stereotypes and perceptions are represented in American reports on Azoreans and mainland Portuguese as well as in Portuguese police reports on the islanders, the US military, and civilian personnel. The newly available archives especially give the perspective of both the Portuguese political police and the American informants, but contrasting the different sources allows for a wider social panorama.

Although this article needs to take into account a number of specific issues in Azorean society and in the social history of Terceira in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century, it is not simply a study of a marginal region in a small European country. First of all, discussing police repression in the Portuguese “periphery” addresses a number of wider issues in Portuguese history, which are important for understanding both the period of continuing authoritarian regimes after the end of the Second World War and the impact of such regimes on peripheral regions, such as the Azores Islands.⁴ Thereby, it offers an interpretation of late Portuguese authoritarian rule, which adds to those on the context of rural areas and small towns in the mainland, an interpretation that is vitally lacking, as much in Portuguese as in international historiography.⁵

This interpretation can also be regarded as part of a wider, Southern European perspective. In such a perspective, Terceira can be seen as a further exemplary case in the (rather small) group of cases reflecting the experiences of controlling rural and peripheral zones within southern European authoritarian states.⁶ Certainly, we need to be cautious when trying to generalize from the example of the Azorean island because Terceira belongs to two analytical factors at the same time: the dynamics and effects of US military bases in southern European societies ruled by authoritarian regimes and the attempts at repression and control at the periphery. Unlike US bases in Spain that were close to Madrid and Cádiz, respectively, and US and NATO interests in Greece, the Terceira airbase was marked by its location on a remote archipelago.⁷ Regarding the experience of a peripheral zone, the presence of the airbase makes the case

different from those of Portuguese small towns of the Minho or the Algarve.⁸ For the Spanish case, the archipelago of the Canary Islands, while having similarities with the Azores, such as a local elite, longer traditions of relations between the islands and the mainland, and a particular type of contact with transnational networks, does not share the experience of a sizeable US troop presence.⁹ Even so, if a structural difference is obvious, Terceira might represent a case in which the US airbase constituted an additional resource for regional resilience at the periphery, and this may have had a multiplying effect on conflicts between the political police and the local elites and police services. It therefore makes sense to reflect on the results of this study in a wider, southern European perspective.

Second, coming back to historical research on Portugal in the twentieth century, the changes and developments in political repression and the subsequent reactions in the Portuguese state after the Second World War have normally only been drawn in very rough strokes. It is true that some aspects of worker mobilization and political opposition—notably with regard to the national electoral campaigns of 1948 and 1958 during which the Salazar regime was seriously challenged for the first time—have been debated.¹⁰ However, few studies interpret developments of the New State on the ground in the smaller towns and the rural constituencies outside of Lisbon and Porto.¹¹

This article attempts to add an archive-based, empirical category to the important studies conducted by António Costa Pinto and others on Portuguese “Fascism,” which see Portuguese realities as part of a broader phenomenon of authoritarian rule in southern European societies. While several functional elements of the *Estado Novo* have been studied over the last decade with an approach that is borrowed from or refers to political science, the progress that has been made in interpreting the documentation left by the organs of the authoritarian state remains insufficient in many regards.¹² As the Portuguese dictatorship was the only one of Europe’s old right-wing authoritarian regimes from the interwar period that both survived the war and introduced afterward some more liberal elements (as opposed to Franco’s Spain), mixing them with a continuation of authoritarian rule in political and social organization, the period between 1945 and 1961 should finally become a real focus of historical research on Portugal.¹³

Third, a study of the introduction of the political police in a small island at the periphery of an empire-state raises the question of cooperation between different actors within an authoritarian system. Namely, this concerns the need for cooperation between the PIDE, the regular police forces (Policia de Seguranca Pública: PSP), and the Portuguese military forces, whose presence on the Azores was relatively strong in view of the strategic position of the archipelago. While the conflicts between such actors have been studied for several authoritarian regimes of the first half of the twentieth century—notably for Nazi Germany—such analysis is still broadly lacking for Portugal’s *Estado Novo*. It has occasionally been pointed out that the Portuguese army had its own agenda in the anticolonial wars in sub-Saharan Africa and that army members sometimes had little sympathy for the activities of agents of political repression in the so-called “overseas territories.” However, this observation has been made for the very particular situation of violent conflict after 1961 and for conditions arising from colonial domination. Scholars have also made an attempt to study internal

conflict for the clashes between different police entities with regard to clandestine migration from Portugal to France.¹⁴ The Azorean case therefore offers an exceptional panorama of such relations, and this issue needs to be taken into account, although in this article, the principal relationship interpreted is that between local elites and the administration and the PIDE. However, we are discussing these conflicts in a context in which the Portuguese military and the PSP also play a role.

Finally, given the importance of the Lajes Airbase on Terceira for US (and NATO) strategic activities in the Atlantic, any study of repressive action by the political police in the island also offers insights into the relationship between Washington and one of its most problematic allies in western Europe, authoritarian Portugal.¹⁵ Luís Nuno Rodrigues has masterfully shed light on the changes within Portuguese-American relations under the Kennedy Administration, and several details are known on the diplomatic context of negotiating the future of the Azorean airbase between 1963 and 1974.¹⁶ However, for the late 1940s and the 1950s, such analysis is very much restricted to the highest, intergovernmental level. Moreover, it has been limited in particular to the special issues of Portugal's integration into Marshall Plan aid and the Portuguese admission into NATO.¹⁷ The interaction of American representatives with agents of the Portuguese administration (including the PIDE) on the Azores is, however, little studied.¹⁸ This article intends to address the lacuna.

Remote Island, Recalcitrant Inhabitants, Central Place of the Cold War: Terceira after 1945

Terceira had over the centuries become a backwater of the Portuguese metropolitan territory: with 60,372 inhabitants counted by the 1950 census, an estimated 10,300 of which were living in the capital, Angra do Heroísmo, it seemed to be a peaceful theatre of activities for a political police that was used to the industrial environments of central and northern Portugal and to the urban agglomerations of Lisbon and Porto.¹⁹ However, the Azores had made themselves a name for being an important place in the 1931 uprising, which had constituted an early warning to the right-wing authoritarian regime in Portugal.²⁰ Various factors, including both structural elements of the island's society and the changes of the war years that had led to the introduction of a more sustained external presence in Terceira, added to the difficulties of authoritarian rule over the island after 1945.²¹ The task of policing populations living in various parts of an archipelago was in any case enormous: in theory, both the civil government and, from 1954 onward, the agents of the PIDE based in Angra do Heroísmo were called upon to control "subversive activities" all over the eastern and northern part of the central group of islands (including Terceira, São Jorge, and Graciosa).

Relatively little has been written regarding the social and political situation of Terceira under the *Estado Novo*. Documentation sent from Angra do Heroísmo to the Ministry of the Interior is rare within Portuguese archives. This is all the more surprising because the Azores had a tradition of being used as place of exile for political deportees, and from 1933 onward, a part of the old fortress of São João Baptista in Angra do Heroísmo was transformed into a




Figure 1: Terceira and the Azores.

political prison. In the second half of the 1930s, this Azorean prison was modified into a transit jail for the labor camps of Tarrafal in São Nicolau and of Tarrafal in Santiago Island, both in Cabo Verde. Hundreds of prisoners continued to pass through Angra before the amnesty of 1945 largely ended the Azores' role in the imprisonment of the political opposition.²² Many of the exiles who had not been in the fortress continued, however, to live in the archipelago.

Probably the best-known report of the 1930s is from Marcello Caetano, who discussed the social and political situation in the Azores after his mission of inquiry in 1938. Caetano criticized, in particular, the weak performance of the local police: the deportees—and even political prisoners held at the Angra fortress, who had permission to occasionally leave the prison—were said to mix with a part of the local elite and to ignore the insufficient proceedings of the thirty local police officers: “on the day of the oath given before the flag of the Legion appeared hoisted red flags, and Communist leaflets were distributed!”²³ Conversely, only two years later, in 1940, the civil governor of Angra do Heroísmo held that the order in Terceira was impressive; in spite of widespread poverty, the inhabitants were reported to be docile and reverential toward the agents of the New State.²⁴ This may have been wishful thinking on the part of an official who hoped to get a favorable evaluation in Lisbon to proceed with his career—but no documentation from that source is available for the 1940s. In the early 1950s, the civil government wrote with enthusiasm about a new, young elite of islanders in the Central Group—of which only a minority had studied on the mainland—who were said to subscribe to the goals of modernization that the *Estado Novo* propagated.²⁵ These claims have never been

interpreted by historians, and the 1950s in the Azores remain a period in historical analysis that is even blander than the first twenty-five years of authoritarian rule. We would claim that the newly found archival series from the PIDE post in Terceira, on which our study relies, entirely changes our level of information under conditions where other sources are unavailable.²⁶

At first glance, the establishment of the US airbase in Lajes appears to be the principal, if not the only, element of change in the history of the Azores after the Second World War.²⁷ Initially under the cover of a concession granted to the British military, followed by a formal agreement on the lease of facilities for a prolonged US presence of twenty-five years, a unit of roughly one thousand US soldiers and specialists at first became based in the north-eastern part of Terceira, with numbers steadily growing throughout the 1950s.²⁸ The base employed hundreds of islanders.²⁹ The interaction of the American personnel with the local population had its effects on consumption behavior, and without a doubt this interaction made Terceira, in the long term, the most “American” of the islands.³⁰ It is remarkable, in the context of the Cold War and given the importance of the base, that the American troop command, COMUSFORAZ, was very relaxed about any dangers of Communist infiltration in the island.³¹ While, as we will show, the Portuguese political police was permanently on alert about possible Communist schemes, an influential COMUSFORAZ report, quoted by the US Embassy in Lisbon, held that “[a]nother endearing quality of the Azoreans which has undoubtedly facilitated joint operations on the Azores is the docility of the people and the lack of any Communist activity among them.”³² This interpretation explains the relative laissez-faire attitude of the base command toward the accusations and alarm cries of the PIDE from 1954.

At the same time, this experience reinforced the more longstanding links between the Azores and the East Coast of the United States: starting with occupation in the whaling industry of the nineteenth century, tens of thousands of Azoreans had migrated to North America.³³ The Azorean communities in the United States and Canada are relatively well studied, and some effort has also been deployed in the analysis of ongoing connections between Azorean society after 1974 and the “diaspora” in North America.³⁴ It is more difficult, however, to obtain a clearer picture of influences between Azorean American communities and the archipelago under the *Estado Novo*.³⁵ Even so, the contact of Azorean employees and the inhabitants of principally Lajes and Praia da Vitória with US staff can be regarded as complementary to older contacts established via emigration.³⁶

However, representatives of the Portuguese state were not only concerned by the interaction as a possible tool for “Americanization” of the islands, which ran counter to the national ideology of the *Estado Novo*. In the case of Angra do Heroísmo, the Portuguese administration also had to deal with a somewhat recalcitrant urban elite. Although Ponta Delgada on São Miguel Island had long been the economic and administrative centerpiece of the archipelago—due to the number of its inhabitants—the island capital of Terceira enjoyed a particular reputation as a stronghold of Portugueseness during critical moments of (proto) national crisis. The educated elite of Angra do Heroísmo, members of the liberal professions in particular, fervently claimed this role in local society and politics.³⁷ Other island capitals in the Azores also experienced the emergence of such claims from the first half of the nineteenth century.³⁸ However, the impact

in Angra do Heroísmo was probably stronger, as the members of the social elite in Terceira particularly felt like harbingers of modernity at a place that had reputedly had a key role in Portuguese history. It was no surprise that the inhabitants of Angra were the first Azoreans to have joined the 1931 rebellion against the regime.

For the 1950s, this does not mean that the members of Terceira's elite, who were sometimes joined by individuals from the civil administration of the mainland taking up elements of "Azorean identity," would act as advocates of separation of or autonomy for the archipelago.³⁹ In terms of political movements, such separatist tendencies had been far stronger under the late monarchy and the Portuguese First Republic.⁴⁰ Open adherence to separatist goals was no longer possible under the *Estado Novo*, which had a strong, relentlessly propagated centralist ideology and employed sufficient means of repression to silence the supporters of Azorean autonomy. In fact, from the late 1930s, "separatists" were no longer among the "subversive tendencies" persecuted by the Portuguese authorities. Only after the Carnation Revolution in 1974 was the political scenery in the Azores changed to make of the archipelago a more separate political theatre, while before that date, the administration was strongly integrated into the centralized structure of the Portuguese state.⁴¹

However, the implementation of a more coherent repressive apparatus on Terceira Island was a strong intrusion into the daily life of the elites on the ground. As members of the local elite group lived in close contact with the regular police forces on the archipelago and were integrated into the local administration, they were concerned by any of the new PIDE activities in the Azores.⁴² When in 1954 João Lourenço, the first commander of the new PIDE post, disembarked in Angra do Heroísmo, he therefore faced the double task of harmonizing the interests of political repression with the preferences of the US allies on the islands⁴³ and finding a *modus vivendi* with the social elite of Terceira. The secret correspondence that the commander of the post had about these problems with his superiors in Lisbon provides ample material on the difficulties encountered in the early phase of the post and constitutes the central empirical evidence of our interpretation. This source material is mainly focused on the years 1954 to 1956, but additional reports allow for observations on the situation of the political police on the island until early 1963, that is, for discussion of the effects of the outbreak of the anticolonial war in Angola and political instability in Lisbon in 1961.

Rough Starts: The PIDE Disembarks in Terceira

The early experiences of the PIDE presence in the Azores were characterized by (partly forced) optimism on the part of the agents of the police and, at the same time, by an early testimony of considerable frustration. On Terceira Island, the small troop was distributed over several minor posts. In Angra do Heroísmo and Praia da Vitória (the second city and main port of the island), the agents hoped to be able to successfully prosecute "subversive individuals" but were quickly overwhelmed by the constant task of controlling ships and their passengers. The early hostile reactions of the local officials with whom the political police had to cooperate showed that Terceira would constitute a difficult territory for police repression. At least some of the foreign residents

responded in part positively to the new procedures introduced by the PIDE. This especially concerned control measures in the harbors, as PIDE agents were now strongly present and the regular police units no longer had to be involved, which before 1954 had slowed down handling operations for ships in the archipelago. Many local managers of naval companies were, therefore, also rather content with the new order, at least in its initial phase, because the PIDE carried out regular inspections of ships, where PSP agents had often simply improvised during their inspections and appeared irregularly, all of a sudden demanding the full attention of the crews. Under the control of PIDE agents based in Lajes and Praia da Vitória, these inspections could be prepared by the temporary recruitment of additional staff to help in the transport of goods into the docks. Therefore, the feedback from shipping companies was also largely positive.

In contrast, the reception of the political police by local and military authorities was far less cordial. In Lajes, the Portuguese military command put the PIDE agents to work at a very narrow desk they had to share with officials of military air traffic control and of the civil aviation company, SATA.⁴⁴ This situation was clearly symptomatic of the lack of interest that the Portuguese military had, at the moment of arrival of the political police officers, in any cooperation. As concerned the civil authorities, they preferred to work with the PSP on all but the most “political” matters.⁴⁵ As far as the minor posts of the PIDE were concerned, civil authorities simply avoided speaking to the agents of the political police.

The conditions of the installation in Lajes remained precarious for nearly two years, with the post commander comparing the “office” to a kind of shabby “hole.” In April 1956, the PIDE agents in this essential part of their activities in Terceira were finally put in new rooms, but the overall impression of these facilities was little better. Also, everything was set up “incredibly slowly,” Lourenço complained. Moreover, humiliations were frequent, as some of the military officers reminded the PIDE official that the original location had been more than enough for the task! Furthermore, the PIDE agents in Lajes had to borrow a telephone from the American staff, as the Portuguese military simply never provided this amenity.⁴⁶

In addition, PIDE agents had little to show in terms of material symbols of their status in the island. Not only did they suffer from their questionable installation—which was worst in Lajes but little better, in the end, in Angra do Heroísmo and Praia da Vitória—but they also struggled with a level of remuneration that was at the lower limit of the necessary funds for an official post in the Azores.

On the one hand, it is obvious that the post commander employed such complaints to impress his financial problems on his superiors in Lisbon and to eventually receive an increase of his salary. On the other hand, however, these complaints correspond with the experiences reported all over the Portuguese empire: in the colonial context of the 1940s and 1950s, many Portuguese officials in service outside of the metropole complained about salaries that were insufficient to pay for everyday expenditures in an expensive environment, where goods had to be imported at sometimes horrendously high prices. The commander at Angra do Heroísmo himself gained a monthly bonus of only five hundred Portuguese escudos more than similar positions on the mainland. Accounting for the higher cost of living in the archipelago, this bonus was small. It was simply insufficient if Lourenço wanted to further improve his

relations with any of the US military staff by inviting them over for dinner and drinks or occasionally buying himself lunch in the canteen of the US Airbase where food and drinks had to be paid for in US dollars.⁴⁷

These difficulties, even if perhaps exaggerated, are evidence of the fact that the cost of living in Terceira after the Second World War was clearly underestimated by the PIDE Directorate-General in Lisbon. No one appeared to regard Terceira as in any way equal to the principal post on Madeira, in Funchal, where the official in charge of the political police received free housing and a special perquisite for hosting meetings with foreign agents and diplomats.⁴⁸ In Terceira, as in the other Azorean islands, such munificence was unknown.

Therefore, while the extension of PIDE activities into the Atlantic islands had become a priority for the *Estado Novo* in the 1950s, this priority was not reflected in the material resources mobilized to support the agents sent into the more “outlying” Azorean islands. Their individual means were therefore limited—including the remuneration that such agents directly received for the task—and the Directorate-General of the PIDE did not undertake any greater efforts to establish their position in Terceira. This provoked numerous difficulties that are particularly well documented for the first two years of the existence of the post, which is the principal period covered by a number of secret reports full of complaints and details on immense problems.

Island Elites and Mainland Intruders: PIDE and Local “Resistance,” 1954–56

Among the local elites in Angra do Heroísmo, skepticism about the new PIDE post was widespread in 1954. “I had the occasion to note that the installation of the post of this Police in Terceira Island caused discontent by nearly the totality of its inhabitants, starting with the Civil Governor,” the commander, João Lourenço, commented in one of his first reports.⁴⁹ Indeed, the civil governor of the District of Angra do Heroísmo, Manuel de Sousa Meneses, preferred not to be personally involved in any issues concerning the work of the political police. In this early phase of the establishment of the post, the civil governor tended to send nonofficial intermediaries to discuss issues of local importance with the PIDE agents. In that regard, Sousa Meneses not only had the support of the elite of Terceira’s island capital, but he could also count on his political prestige when confronting the agents of the PIDE. He had been a veteran supporter of the right-wing junta that had taken power in Portugal in 1926 and a deputy of the regime’s unity party, the União Nacional, in the Portuguese National Assembly for over eight years.⁵⁰ This made it difficult for the post commander of the PIDE to target him. Nevertheless, the commander did attempt to attack the civil governor, sending reports to Lisbon that urged that measures be taken against the political elite of the island. Principally, Lourenço accused Sousa Meneses of having an entourage of “suspect individuals” in his service. The civil governor—while having been informed of the accusation—did not even make the effort to respond to this attack.⁵¹

The relationship that the PIDE had with the mayor of Angra do Heroísmo, Anselmo de Sousa Bettencourt e Silveira, was also rather unfriendly. The mayor was careful not to appear as an opponent of PIDE activities, but Lourenço was convinced that he followed a course of small provocations against the police. Worse yet, the PIDE did not even find much support among the other leading

politicians of the União Nacional, the unity party, on Terceira. According to the post commander, the president of the party's district committee, Dr. Manuel Flores Brasil, was a "pagan" whose attitudes endangered the prestige of a "Catholic nation," and Lourenço considered him suspect for having lent an ear to the opinions of his brothers, António and Francisco Flores Brasil, whom the political police regarded as devoted Communists. The main "hard proof" for this accusation was that Manuel Flores Brasil, in his main activity as medical doctor, had repeatedly mocked patients who were imploring, in his surgery, the help of God and had declared himself an adversary of "superstition."⁵² These reports show that the agents of political police repression, in an unfamiliar environment, had a clear tendency toward attacking anyone who did not fit into their model of a "Catholic nation" and that these agents did not at all understand that they dealt, in Terceira, with established structures of civil and military power, which could not simply be censured in that way. A lack of reaction from Lisbon was the consequence of these misjudgments on the part of the police officers.

The adverse reaction of local elites to the intrusion of the political police was so strong that the few sympathizers of the new PIDE activity in Terceira themselves came under pressure. The president of the District Commission (Junta-Geral) of Angra do Heroísmo, Dr. José Leal Armas, a young veterinary doctor, had attempted to secure a better material installation for the PIDE post. As a consequence, the annoyed civil governor of the district worked behind the scenes to bring about the dismissal of Leal Armas.⁵³ This scheme did not work in the end, and Leal Armas remained in his post for several years more,⁵⁴ but the affair illustrates the degree of opposition that leading groups of local political life showed toward the activity of the police and their principal supporters on the ground.⁵⁵

Even when it came to the pursuit of "Communist elements," which officially was the main task for which the PIDE had been introduced to the islands, antipathy between João Lourenço's team and the civil authorities was so substantial that little progress was made. All the more, Lourenço felt the need to show successes. What he presented as a most dangerous "Communist cell" in Terceira was a heterogeneous group of individuals, among whom were religious dissenters and alleged contrabandists. However, even with the employment of arrests and torture, no real "Communist" ground was dismantled in Terceira.⁵⁶

Trips made to other islands of the central group, which fell into the catchment of the PIDE base in Terceira, did not at all reassure the post commander at Angra do Heroísmo. Their experiences during such stays were as disappointing as the frequent blunders on the main island of the central group. Far from being a counterpoint to "subversive tendencies" among the elite in the island capital, conditions seemed to be even worse on the more remote islands, where the PIDE agents from Terceira did not regularly manage to go. Lourenço was particularly worried by the situation on São Jorge Island, which had approximately 16,500 inhabitants by 1954 and was, according to the PIDE official, "practically governed by individuals who had always been in opposition to the current regime." Manuel Faustino Nunes, the mayor of Calheta, the second city on São Jorge, had indeed supported Norton de Matos in the precampaign for the presidency in 1948, and his poorly concealed, antiregime opinions had repeatedly aroused the anger of the few members of the Portuguese Legion on the

island. Nevertheless, the civil governor in Angra do Heroísmo, Sousa Meneses, had not felt it appropriate to intervene in any way against Faustino Nunes's activities, and the governor's predecessors had previously been lenient over the matter.⁵⁷ In Lourenço's view, still worse was the attitude of the health officer on the island, Dr. José Alberto Carvalho Malheiro.⁵⁸ For the PIDE post commander, Malheiro was a "heretic." he latter was indeed quite critical about the work of the religious institutions in different subdivisions of São Jorge, and he attacked the "bad service" offered by these institutions with regard to health-care.⁵⁹ Lourenço sent a fierce report on Malheiro's behavior back to Lisbon, but this was apparently neutralized by the lack of endorsement given to the PIDE complaints on the part of the civil authorities in Angra.⁶⁰

Most surprising, however, was the fact that in São Jorge, the PIDE did not even manage to neutralize the lawyer Rui de Mendonça in Velas—the island capital. Mendonça, as a veteran of the 1931 revolutionary movement, appears as an obvious target for political police investigations. Once again, the support given to PIDE activities by local authorities was lukewarm. While Lourenço reported on Mendonça's political opinions as "Communist," no prosecution followed, and when Mendonça passed away in 1958, he died not only as a free man, but also as an active lawyer.⁶¹

However, PIDE officials alleged that they gained greater acceptance from Terceira's island elites during the first two years of their stay. Lourenço constantly attempted to make the Angra do Heroísmo post acceptable to Terceira's administrative and social elite. In addition, the PIDE inspector and feared commissioner Agostinho Barbieri de Figueiredo Batista Cardoso passed through the Azores in late 1955 and admonished civil authorities to be more welcoming to the activities of the political police. This outreach appeared to cause some rapprochement between the PIDE agents and the islanders. By 1956, the commander of the post drew a friendlier picture of "progress" made in the island. In his analysis, Lourenço recollected that

our arrival brought upon a certain dissatisfaction of the population, aggravated by a show of distrust on the part of some authorities who had been obliged to work with us, as all regarded the International Police as if it were a "bogeyman," which only came to do them harm.

In what must be regarded as unsurprising self-aggrandizement, given that it was an official report to superiors, the commander of the post claimed that in 1956 these differences had already disappeared.⁶² However, a closer reading of Lourenço's reports shows that the civil authorities still had little real interest in cooperating with the political police—after some intimidation from the PIDE inspectors, the elite of Angra do Heroísmo had simply decided that it was a better idea not to oppose too openly the requests of the police agents. However, they continued to avoid the PIDE wherever possible.⁶³

The difficulties had not completely disappeared as is obvious from the repeated attempts by the PIDE post to question the political loyalty of members of Terceira's administrative elite. Two years after the initial hostile reception in his new post, Lourenço attempted to use the problems that had occurred during the visit of Subsecretary of State for National Education Baltasar Rebelo de Sousa to mobilize state repression against Terceira's local elites. He not only claimed that

the visitor (showing “conditions in the Azores to his travel companion, the Apostolic Nuncio in Lisbon) was profoundly unsettled by the lack of care shown by local authorities for the schools on the islands, but it was also expressed in the reports that the Terceira elite sought an open, and clearly symbolic, affront to the representative of the Salazarist state:

Although we do still not know all of the details, it is also a fact that His Excellence departed from here with a very bad impression of the ways in which he was received by the Governor of the District, who hosted him in the Palace of the Civil Government, and where, contrary to the publications by some factions of the press, no celebrations or dinners were organized that could have been described as a “gala dinner.”

The acts were limited to the presentation of a *fado* singer, of approximately 60 years of age, who interpreted regional songs, accompanied by two instruments that were entirely out of tune. The fact that these acts replaced the gala music event that had been announced, annoyed His Excellence terribly, and also the group with which he came to the island, and the other spectators that were present.

As concerns the dinner that they also called a “gala dinner,” and to which some of the most senior political representatives in this town were invited, as had been said, in a boastful way, in all kinds of journals, it was nothing but a simple and unsophisticated meal in a modest restaurant. Here, they even went as far as to give His Excellence, by error, cuprimol, or a similar drug, instead of Cinzano Vermouth, as aperitif.⁶⁴

Lourenço’s plan was unsuccessful in the end, as his superiors in Lisbon were occupied with other issues. Also, the attacks against Manuel de Sousa Meneses had in the meantime become half-hearted. The post commander of the PIDE, like his few sympathizers in the island, feared that Sousa Meneses could be replaced by Ramiro Valadão, who was then a deputy for Terceira in the National Assembly and political commentator of the União Nacional in Lisbon. Although Ramiro Valadão was the son of one of the most eminent Azorean politicians of the 1910s and 1920s and later became the almighty propaganda director (and even chairman of the directors’ board) of Radio Televisão Portugal (RTP), Lourenço gave him in 1956 the virtue of a “dubious political past.” While the current civil governor was seen by the PIDE commander as problematic, an even more right-wing alternative candidate who had some backing in the islands seemed to him dangerous: this shows the dramatic rift existing between the attitudes and predilections of Terceira’s elite and the goals of the political police.⁶⁵ Between 1954 and 1956, contrary to the picture that João Lourenço drew in his reports, these hostilities only increased. Such hostilities even threatened the other principal goal of PIDE’s presence on the island: the success of the PIDE mission with regard to the American airbase was not made easier by the hostilities of local authorities who had links to the Portuguese military based on Terceira.

The Impenetrable Fortress: “Suspect” Portuguese Citizens in the Lajes Airbase and the “Americanization” of Terceira

Already in July 1954, João Lourenço noted that the superior salaries offered by employment in the American airbase attracted “individuals coming from all

parts.” These Portuguese employees worked both in the construction and maintenance of the airstrips and as secretaries and interpreters in the offices. Not much was known about the political attitudes of these employees. Recruitment had been done with the consent of the Portuguese military authorities—in theory, the civil government and the PSP knew who these employees were—but without any consultation with PIDE officials.⁶⁶ Even after the installment of the PIDE post in June, no cooperation in the recruitment process had been sought by the Portuguese military. PIDE officials claimed that radio programs “from Moscow” called upon employees in the airbase to sabotage “Western” material, but the Portuguese military authorities in the Azores were only slightly affected by such references to the shadows of the Cold War.⁶⁷ US military police also did not share the preoccupations of the Portuguese PIDE—they held that in the Azores, Communist activity was virtually unknown. This open dismissal of his warnings was a humiliation for Lourenço and his team.⁶⁸

A paradigmatic case for the limits of control and repression in 1954 was that of former flight sergeant José de Carvalho, then in his sixties. Carvalho had joined the Sarmento Beires Revolt on the mainland in 1931 and had, in this short-lived struggle against the military junta in Lisbon, launched bombs over Almada. He had then been judged by a military tribunal and deported in 1934 to Terceira for life-long exile. After a general amnesty and after the bankruptcy of his small luggage-producing firm that lost out against a Macau Chinese competitor in Terceira, Carvalho managed to get employment in the airbase through the support of the deputy commander of the Portuguese military force in the island (who had been a friend of the former flight sergeant over some time but who afterward claimed he had known nothing about Carvalho’s past). In what followed, the Portuguese military authorities felt they had to get rid of this employee, but after his dismissal “because of old age,” Carvalho was able to mobilize the local authorities, and even the civil governor of the island, in his favor. Therefore, João Lourenço found himself in an awkward situation in which it was difficult to act against local networks of support, even when it came to repression against a “suspect” who had a documented role against the New State in the 1930s. The commander of the PIDE post had to call for support from Lisbon to proceed with his actions against this “suspect person,” which, after a prolonged struggle of some months, finally allowed him to end Carvalho’s service for the American base.⁶⁹

The PIDE post was more immediately successful in bringing about the dismissal of carpenter, António Gomes Rego, who, although reputed to be pro-Communist, had been employed in a firm that worked on the premises of the American airbase.⁷⁰ However, Rego was spared from imprisonment on various occasions through the sympathy of US army staff and the indifference of the Portuguese authorities with regard to wishes of the PIDE agents.⁷¹ And, in spite of constant attempts, Lourenço did not manage to obtain any special permission to operate within what he called the “forbidden zone” of the base, where the US military police had the exclusive right of control.⁷² Moreover, the PIDE noted that parties were held in this zone, where not only the eighty Portuguese permanent employees but also members of their family and their friends had the chance to evade the watchful eye of the political police.⁷³ The US military police commander initially showed little interest in exercising any tighter control

over these persons—despite the commander of the PIDE post arguing that these individuals could gain access to nuclear material, among other dangers.⁷⁴

The Portuguese authorities of the Airbase Number 4, tucked in the shadow of the American concession, apparently did not offer even the slightest help to introduce the PIDE agents to their American colleagues. Lourenço finally bypassed the Portuguese military officers and managed to enter into direct contact with some of the officials of the US American command and with the American consul in the Azores. This was an important yet limited victory for the political police, which gave the PIDE staff somewhat more access to vital information. The agents of the political police managed to build up this relatively good understanding with the American officers partly by offering to facilitate the entry of the American personnel into the Azores. The US command at Lajes Airbase was content to thereby speed up the bureaucratic processes, which were known to be extremely time-consuming.⁷⁵

Relations between the PIDE post and the national armed forces in the Azores, on the other hand, did not become much warmer in the years after the instalment of the political police in Terceira. The Portuguese army command in the island treated the agents of the PIDE as if they were simple sergeants or under-sergeants of their own troops—and this was neatly symbolized by the prohibiting of the agents permanently active in Lajes from entering the officers' canteen. Lourenço's account of these complicated relations is extremely telling:

Under these conditions, it was always difficult to approach them with regard to issues for which, however much we regarded them as being of vital importance for the security of the State, the Portuguese officers never showed the minimum of interest, and this was probably so because they were presented by individuals considered by army officers to be of an inferior category and mentality. For this reason, I have already spent a great number of days at Lajes, without being received by any of the officials to whom I needed to expose some of those issues, or any other questions having to do with our services.⁷⁶

While the political police were therefore eternally frustrated by the lack of sympathy shown by the Portuguese army, they also constantly commented on the risk of “denationalization” prevalent on Terceira. As part of the US American strategy to facilitate relations with the islanders—which was partly suggested to them by their partners in the Portuguese military—the airbase took an active part in aid measures provided to the population of Faial Island during the emergency situation of volcanic eruption and disaster in 1957. This humanitarian aid activity was strengthened in 1963 during urgent storm repairs in Praia da Vitória and during the earthquake in São Jorge in early 1964.⁷⁷ And the inhabitants of Terceira, Lourenço summarized, were generally impressed by the better material conditions that the presence of the US base had brought them. Not only did the American airbase seem to attract subversive individuals who knew how to profit from the unusual protection created by the presence of the allied power, but also, the low standard of living under the Salazarist *Estado Novo* compared quite unfavorably with the opportunities for considerable wages through work that the American airbase as the richest employer on the island could offer.⁷⁸ A considerable number of Terceira's inhabitants were still walking around barefoot in the first half of the 1950s—and the new incomes obtained by the employees of the base contrasted sharply with these deprivations.⁷⁹

The complicated relationship between the US military presence and the islanders was evident through various facts. A section of the elites of Angra do Heroísmo warned against the risks of American materialism and the cultural influence of the personnel of the Lajes airbase.⁸⁰ But during village festivals, the Stars and Stripes were seen everywhere, while, as PIDE informants had it, the villagers were “without a single national flag to be found among them.” In Angra do Heroísmo itself, American military police ran regular patrols as the town was considered a potential place where US soldiers could go—although the vast majority stayed in the vicinity of the base or occasionally went to Praia da Vitória during their free time.⁸¹ Military patrols meant that US officials armed with “big guns,” as Lourenço had it, went into restaurants and cafés in the island capital. This did not fail to leave an impression on Terceira’s urban population—and the PIDE blamed the Portuguese army for not attempting to change these conditions.⁸²

With regard to this trend toward “Americanization,” the problem was therefore delicate. While it was obviously impossible to accuse the NATO partner of ignoring the security problems of Portugal’s New State in the Azores and of encouraging the Azoreans to loosen their ties to the mainland, the presence of the airbase was not regarded as beneficial to national unity by the political police. However, PIDE agents did not find a solution to this difficult problem—and the attitudes shown by US officials were just another element of frustration for an inefficient police presence in Terceira.⁸³

Conclusion

December 1961 ended a year that had been extremely turbulent with regard to the future of Portugal’s right-wing authoritarian regime: broad anticolonial rebellion had started in Angola and transformed into a complicated war and a failed attempt by moderate army officials to topple the Salazar regime. Called the *Abrilada*, the event had shaken the Portuguese government. Salazar’s *Estado Novo* had survived these turbulent months, but the degree of nervousness was extreme even at the remotest posts of the Portuguese political police.

Therefore, the successors of João Lourenço and his first team of PIDE agents in Terceira attempted to give an update of the dangers of subversion in the island, which referred to the unstable conditions under which the Portuguese state seemed to operate. Like in the early years of the PIDE presence, for these individual police agents, it remained difficult to distinguish between sympathizers of the Portuguese opposition on the continent and religious “dissenters” and “atheists,” between the leaders of short-lived protest against difficult labor conditions and members of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). Unsurprisingly, low- and even middle-rank officials of the political police lived in a universe in which many forms of behavior were “suspect” per se. The reports given by the interim commander of the political police post in Angra do Heroísmo in 1961–62 illustrate that the hostilities of the island’s elite toward the PIDE had remained alive and that many of the forms of behavior exhibited by the islanders appeared to threaten the ideal of a “Catholic nation” and to challenge the social order that the *Estado Novo* still wanted to impose. The new governor of the District of Angra do Heroísmo, Teotónio Machado Pires, did not hesitate to openly criticize, in the presence of US personnel, the

anti-American incidents in Lisbon that had followed the initial phase of the anticolonial war in Angola.⁸⁴

In late 1961, PIDE agents described the political climate among the urban population of the island as generally satisfactory, but, clearly, Terceira's social elite attempted, as much as between 1954 and 1956, to keep their distance from the political police. Police officers pointed to a deep feeling of Catholic faith as an explanation for the loyalty of the more "humble" islanders, but even this picture was quite ambivalent: the same officers commented that various "subversive" religious groups were active on the island, including the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Baha'i. Unsurprisingly, these movements—although their importance was relatively weak even in the short term and they were not at all openly anticolonial—prospered through the protection given by the US airbase. Using tracts in Portuguese printed in Brazil, the ideas of these groups were openly promoted by some of the American staff in conversation with Portuguese employees of the base. Still in 1961, Portuguese political police had no opportunity of getting into the American Sergeants Club, into the canteen of the installations, or into any of the inner parts where Portuguese staff of the base circulated freely. Informers for the political police among the Portuguese employees even claimed that, by the early 1960s, opposition newspapers were occasionally sold in these parts of the base. What made these conditions worse was the fact that the Portuguese military authorities remained apparently unwilling to take any stricter measures.⁸⁵

The misfortunes of the PIDE on Terceira give characteristic evidence on a number of issues related to authoritarian rule in small (southern) European states and beyond. First, it was complicated for the New State to introduce its authoritarian mechanisms in peripheral parts of the Portuguese territory, where other types of a *modus vivendi* had been found in the first twenty-eight years after the fall of the Republic. In the Azores, the authoritarian Portuguese state had only exerted a limited amount of repression after Azorean support for the 1931 revolt. Although the Azoreans who were being installed in positions of local civil government between 1931 and the 1950s were all in theory supporters of the Salazar regime, an island elite society had been recreated in which the adherents of liberal political tendencies had been integrated. This society was also able to integrate former deportees and exiles, who in the early 1930s had been opponents of the *Estado Novo*. It was even willing to allow for political activists who had supported Norton de Matos in the late 1940s (particularly those who lived on outlying islands of the Central Group—at the periphery of the periphery—and who were unlikely to interfere in the activities of Terceira's civil government). Terceira's social and administrative elite were not at all happy about an approach toward repression that, at least in theory, demanded rigid and total control, in which "suspect" individuals even in remote areas and of the lowest social status were to be prosecuted and eliminated. Therefore, the island elite were willing to lend a hand to some individuals prosecuted by the PIDE, whenever this could be done without taking too much personal risk. Between 1954 and 1961, Azorean members of the civil government in Terceira perceived the advantages represented by the presence of the PIDE post to be meagre—and discontent caused by what the island elite regarded as an inadequate intrusion by police forces remained a source of constant irritation.

At the same time, these frictions between the agents of political repression in the service of an authoritarian regime and local authorities in a peripheral region may be typical for the lack of efficacy that such repression had in southern European authoritarian states, especially in the period after the Second World War. It shows that under an established authoritarian regime, where brutal repression had already been the rule for decades, local authorities were nevertheless extremely unwilling to accept further extensions of repressive control. At the periphery of these states, where the possibilities to evade such control in the early phases of authoritarian rule had been considerable, resistance by local elites to any attempts at intensified control was probably even more sustained. The effect was, in the case of Terceira, indeed multiplied by the presence of the US airbase that gave additional opportunities for evading political police repression.

In the case of Terceira, and, to a lesser extent, of the Azores as a whole, this factor appears in combination with the internal divisions within the authoritarian state, as represented by the opposition between the PIDE and the Portuguese army command in the archipelago. It shows that massive conflicts over the “right degree” of repression and control did not only exist in colonial war theatres, such as Angola, Portuguese Guinea, or Mozambique, where the army and the political police often clashed. Even without the aggravating circumstances of a complicated war, Portuguese army officials disliked the activities of the PIDE and eagerly constrained their room for maneuver—despite the PIDE agents’ claim that their action was decisive for the safety of Portuguese military interest.

Finally, in Terceira, repressive control remained an entirely conservative force with regard to spheres of social life such as material consumption, cultural influences, and religion. The agents of the political police were concerned that the US airbase “Americanized” life in the Azores and took away from the bulk of the complicated islanders the one principal disciplinary force that still bound them to patriotic behavior, which allegedly was their Catholic faith. Instead of engaging critically with the phenomenon of Azorean links to the United States, for which the airfield in Lajes was only an additional factor, the PIDE principally focused on “obnoxious” effects of such cultural influence—the influence being an obvious fact—at least from the end of the Second World War. This negative approach was entirely counterproductive, as already in the 1950s, it was clear that the future of the New State regime was very much dependent upon the support of its most important Western ally, the United States, and that the existence of a US military presence on the Azores was a vital component of perpetuating this support.⁸⁶ The activity of the PIDE, newly installed in 1954 in an archipelago in which the US activity on Terceira was a given variable, showed a lack of realism in adapting itself to this American presence. Therefore, it is unsurprising that political police repression was never introduced in the inner part of the US airbase, as cooperation between the political police and the US forces remained superficial. The Lajes Airfield remained a safe haven for critical comments over the rest of the *Estado Novo* period.

Endnotes

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1. See the rather descriptive overview in Dalila Cabrita Mateus and Álvaro Mateus, *Angola 61—Guerra Colonial: Causas e Consequências* (Lisbon, 2011) and a discussion of the impact of the coup d'état in the longer experience of the last fourteen years before the end of the *Estado Novo* in Richard A. H. Robinson, "Portugal, the Colonies and the 1974 Revolution," in *Thirty Years of Portuguese Decolonization*, ed. Stewart Lloyd-Jones and António Costa Pinto (Bristol, UK, 2003): 1–15.

2. On the forms of reporting on "subversion," see Dalila Cabrita Mateus, *A PIDE/DGS na Guerra Colonial (1961–1974)* (Lisbon, 2004); on the evolution of the PIDE from the 1930s, with relation to other European secret services, see Douglas L. Wheeler, "In the Service of Order: The Portuguese Political Police and the British, German and Spanish Intelligence, 1932–1945," *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 1 (1983): 1–25. Historical overviews on the PIDE are from Maria da Conceição Ribeiro, *A Polícia Política no Estado Novo (1926–1945)* (Lisbon, 1995) and Irene Flunser Pimentel, *A História da PIDE* (Lisbon, 2007).

3. The analysis of the Azores as an exemplary case for changes in Portuguese and European political history has been proposed much earlier for the second half of the nineteenth century; see Diego Palacios Cerezales, "O Princípio de Autoridade e os Motins Antifiscais de 1862," *Análise Social* 42, no. 182 (2007): 35–53.

4. The idea of a common type of authoritarian experience in southern European societies of the twentieth century—especially Portugal, Spain, and Greece, to which Italy is sometimes added—is alluded to in a number of studies. More profound conceptual thought is less common, see for an example of conceptual analysis the introduction to a special issue in *South European Society and Politics* in António Costa Pinto, "The Authoritarian Past and South European Democracies: An Introduction," *South European Society and Politics* 15, no. 3 (2010): 339–58.

5. An important older study is Joyce Riegelhaupt, "Os Camponeses e a Política no Portugal de Salazar—o Estado Corporativo e o Apoliticismo nas Aldeias," *Análise Social* 15, no. 59 (1979): 505–23.

6. This theme has found much more coverage for authoritarian states in Central Europe; the abundant literature on NS rule over rural areas and smaller towns in Germany is proof for that. See Michael Schepua, *Nationalsozialismus in der pfälzischen Provinz: Herrschaftspraxis und Alltagsleben in den Gemeinden des heutigen Landkreises Ludwigshafen 1933–1945* (Ludwigshafen, 2000); Katharina Stengel, *Nationalsozialismus in der Schwalm 1930–1939* (Marburg, 2016); and the various contributions in the classic Horst Möller, Andreas Wirsching, and Walter Ziegler, eds., *Nationalsozialismus in der Region: Beiträge zur regionalen und lokalen Forschung und zum internationalen Vergleich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996).

7. Carlos Escudé, "¿Cuánto valen esas Bases? El Tira y Afloja entre Estados Unidos y España, 1951–1953," *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* 25 (2003): 61–81; Konstantina Maragkou, "Favouritism in NATO's Southeastern Flank: The Case of the Greek Colonels, 1967–74," *Cold War History* 9, no.3 (2009): 347–66.

8. Rui Ramos, "O Estado Novo perante os Poderes Periféricos: o Governo de Assis Gonçalves em Vila Real (1934–39)," *Análise Social* 22, no. 90 (1986): 109–35; Maria João Raminhos Duarte, *Silves e o Algarve: Uma História da Oposição à Ditadura* (Lisbon, 2010).

9. See Victorio Heredero Gascuña et al., "La Represión en Tenerife durante el primer Franquismo (1939–1959)," in *El Franquismo en Canarias*, ed. Aarón León Álvarez (Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 2014): 223–45 and the older and less analytic Ricardo A. Guerra

Palmero, *Sobrevivir en Canarias (1939–1959): Racionamiento, Miseria y Estraperlo* (Santa Cruz de Tenerife, 2006).

10. For an exceptional example, see Armando B. Malheiro da Silva, “A Candidatura à Presidência da República do General Norton de Matos e o Boletim Eleições Livres no Distrito de Braga (1949),” in *Norton de Matos e as Eleições Presidenciais de 1949: 60 Anos depois*, eds. Heloisa Paulo and Helena Pinto Janeiro (Lisbon, 2010): 57–83.

11. A long-term approach to the analysis of popular revolts and repression can be found in Diego Palacios Cerezales, *Portugal à Coronhada: Protesto popular e Ordem pública nos Séculos XIX e XX* (Lisbon, 2011).

12. For more recent approaches, see Víctor Pereira, *La Dictature de Salazar face à l’Emigration: L’Etat portugais et ses Migrants en France (1957–1974)* (Paris, 2012); João Madeira, ed., *Vítimas de Salazar: Estado Novo e Violência política* (Lisbon, 2007) and Víctor Pereira and Nuno Domingos, eds., *O Estado Novo em Questão* (Lisbon, 2010).

13. Important insights from the perspective of the political scientist can be found in António Costa Pinto, *The Salazar’s Dictatorship and European Fascism: Problems of Interpretation* (New York, 1995) and Costa Pinto, “Le Salazarisme et le Fascisme européen,” *Vingtième Siècle* 62 (1999): 15–25.

14. Víctor Pereira, “El Poder de la Impotencia: Policías y Migración clandestina entre Portugal y Francia (1957–1974),” *Política y Sociedad* 42, no. 3 (2006): 103–20.

15. On the legal context of the Lajes Airbase between 1951 and 1961, see C. M. Pettus, *Analysis of the Azores Base Agreements*. (without number), November 9, 1961, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC (henceforth NARA), Department of State Decimal Files (henceforth DSDF), RG 59, Box 1818.

16. On the international context of the US military base on the Azores, see Luís Nuno Rodrigues, *Kennedy–Salazar: a Crise de uma Aliança: As Relações Luso-Americanas entre 1961 e 1963* (Lisbon, 2002); Witney W. Schneidmann, *Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial Empire* (Lanham, MD, 2004), and, on the context of Luso-American relations immediately before the Carnation Revolution, Adolfo Cueto Rodriguez, “Portugal, la Guerra Colonial y el ‘As’ en la Manga: El Valor geoestratégico de la Base de Lajes en las Azores,” in *Nuevos Horizontes del Pasado: Culturas políticas, Identidades y Representación*, ed. Ángeles Barrio Alonso, Jorge de Hoyos Puente, and Rebeca Saavedra Ariás (Santander, 2011), CD-ROM.

17. These issues are discussed in Maria Fernanda Rollo, *Portugal e o Plano Marshall: Da Rejeição à Solicitação da Ajuda Financeira Norte-Americana (1947–1952)* (Lisbon, 1994), and Nuno Severiano Teixeira, “From Neutrality to Alignment: Portugal in the Foundation of the Atlantic Pact,” *Luso-Brazilian Review* 29, no. 2 (1992): 113–26.

18. The common defense interests and need for cooperation between Portuguese and US troops in the island are discussed in William P. Boswell, American Vice Consul in the Azores, *Strengthening of Azorean Anti-Aircraft Defenses* (n° 753b.51/10-250), October 2, 1950, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 3718.

19. Instituto Nacional de Estatística, *IX Recenseamento Geral da População no Continente e Ilhas Adjacentes em 15 de Dezembro de 1950. Tomo I: População Residente e Presente, Famílias, Casais, Mulheres Casadas, Convivências, Estrangeiros, Cegos, Surdos-Mudos e Órfãos* (Lisbon, 1952): 34.

20. Célia Reis, *A Revolta de Madeira e Açores (1931)* (Lisbon, 1990): 29–30.

21. Carlos Enes, “Ponta Delgada: o Movimento de Contestação à Política do Estado Novo em 1932–33,” *Boletim do Instituto Histórico da Ilha Terceira* 48 (1990): 507–36.

22. Victor Barros, *Campos de Concentração em Cabo Verde: as Ilhas como Espaços de Deportação e de Prisão no Estado Novo* (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2009): 58–64.

23. Polícia de Segurança Pública—Lei Orgânica dos Serviços das Juntas Gerais dos Distritos Autónomos das Ilhas, Marcello Caetano to Minister of the Interior (without number), September 22, 1938, Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Portugal (henceforth ANTT), Ministério do Interior (henceforth MI), Gabinete do Ministro (henceforth GM), Mç 507.

24. Abílio Carvalho, Civil Governor of Angra do Heroísmo, to Ministry of the Interior, *Relatório do Governador do Distrito Autónomo de Angra do Heroísmo, apresentado em Outubro de 1940 após 9 Mezes de Governo* (without number), without date, ANTT/MI/GM, Mç 518: 2–4.

25. Cândido Pamplona Forjaz, Governor of the District of Angra do Heroísmo, to Ministry of the Interior (n° 1341/A/43), September 22, 1951, ANTT, MAI_ACL_MAI_GM_GBT012, CX0069.

26. Information from the civil government in Angra do Heroísmo accessible in the Portuguese Ministry of the Interior archives effectively stops with the 1940 reports. The District Archives in Angra do Heroísmo contain reports from the civil governors, but those are unclassified and cannot be consulted.

27. António José Telo, *Os Açores e o Controlo do Atlântico, 1898–1948* (Lisbon, 1993).

28. Luís Nuno Rodrigues, *No Coração do Atlântico: os Estados Unidos e os Açores (1939–1948)* (Lisbon, 2005).

29. Duncan A. D. Mackay, First Secretary of the US Embassy in Lisbon, *Some Characteristics of Our Association with the Portuguese on the Azores* (n° 160), April 18, 1960, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 1818: 5.

30. Avelino Freitas de Meneses, *As Lajes da Ilha Terceira: Aspectos da sua História* (Angra do Heroísmo, 2001).

31. See the classic Melvyn P. Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–48,” *American Historical Review* 89, no. 2 (1984): 346–81, at 350–54, on the broader US strategy of controlling the Atlantic.

32. Mackay, *Some Characteristics*, April 18, 1960, Box 1818: 2.

33. The American command in Lajes argued that the links between descendants of Azoreans in North America and the inhabitants of the archipelago were one of the reasons for the success of the base, see Mackay, *Some Characteristics*, April 18, 1960, Box 1818: 1.

34. Nunes Rocha, Gilberta Pavão, and Derrick Mendes, “Experiências da Emigração açoriana,” *Portuguese Studies Review* 20, no. 2 (2012): 33–58; João Leal, *Azorean Identity in Brazil and the United States: Arguments About History, Culture and Transnational Connections* (Dartmouth, 2011).

35. F. W. Chapin, “Channels for Change: Emigrant Tourists and the Class Structure of Azorean Migration,” *Human Organization* 51, no. 1 (1992): 44–52.

36. Jerry R. Williams, *And Yet They Come: Portuguese Immigration from the Azores to the United States* (New York, 1982).

37. Paulo Silveira e Sousa, “Gerir o Dinheiro e a Distinção: as Caixas Económicas de Angra do Heroísmo e os seus Corpos Dirigentes (1845–1915),” *Arquipélago (História, 2ª série)* 6 (2002): 293–346.

38. Paulo Lopes Matos, "Santa Cruz da Ilha Graciosa (1799–1850): População, Grupos Familiares e Profissões," *Arquipélago* (História, 2ª série) 4, no. 2 (2000): 257–98.
39. On the careers of locally born individuals as civil governors of the Azores in the 1950s, see the comment in Harold M. Mifkiff, American Vice Consul in the Azores, *Departure of Governor Aniceto Antonio dos Santos. New Governor Designate is a Native of São Miguel Island*. (n° 753b.00/12-954), 9 December 1954, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 3718: 1.
40. José Guilherme Reis Leite, *Política e Administração nos Açores de 1870 a 1910: O Primeiro Movimento Autonomista* (Ponta Delgada, 1995); Luís Manuel Machado Menezes, "A Autonomia e o 'Movimento Autonomico' nos Anos Vinte do Século XX," *Boletim do Instituto Histórico da Ilha Terceira* 45 (1987): 839–53.
41. Arnaldo Ourique, "O Governo das Ilhas Portuguesas no Final do Século XX," *Arquipélago* (História, 2ª série) 7 (2003): 197–226.
42. The US observers in the Azores were impressed by the high level of influence that a local elite had, partly via the district government, over the regular police force. See William P. Boswell, American Vice Consul in the Azores, *Report: The Political Organization of the Azores* (n° 753b.00/11-1350), November 13, 1950, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 3718: 7.
43. On earlier information of the US agents on PIDE activities in São Miguel Island, see William P. Boswell, *List of Present Personnel of PIDE in Ponta Delgada* (n° 753b.521/10–1850), October 18, 1950, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 3718.
44. João Lourenço, Commander of PIDE Post in Angra do Heroísmo, to Director-General of the PIDE (n° 1/54-S.R.), June 30, 1954, ANTT, Archives of the Polícia Internacional e da Defesa do Estado/Direcção-Geral de Segurança (henceforth PIDE/DGS), Delegações e Postos (henceforth DP), Angra do Heroísmo, 23, Relatórios periódicos e extraordinários—confidenciais (henceforth RPE-C), NP 304: 1–2.
45. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 5.
46. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/56-S.V.F.), May 12, 1956, RPEC, NP 304: 2–3.
47. Only Portuguese military officers had access to US installations at favorable conditions, with some Portuguese civilians becoming honorary members of clubs and casinos. By 1960, the PIDE officials had not received this status. See Mackay, *Some Characteristics*, April 18, 1960, Box 1818: 4.
48. Lourenço to Director-General (no. 1/56-S.V.F.), May 12, 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 4–5.
49. Lourenço to Director-General (no. 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 1.
50. This situation is very different from that of the government of the District of Ponta Delgada, where the governor, Aniceto dos Santos, was very hostile to the activities of the União Nacional and hampered their activities; see Alfred LaFreniere, American Consul in the Azores, *Reported Incident in the Local Election of District Commission of the União Nacional (Government Party)*. (n° 753b.00/5-2952), May 29, 1952, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 3718: 1.
51. Lourenço to Director-General (no. 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 1.
52. Lourenço to Director-General (no. 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 3.
53. For the American perspective on the prerogatives of district governors, see Boswell, *Report*, November 13, 1950, Box 3718: 8.
54. On the further role of Leal Armas, see Virgílio Cunha, Commander of PIDE Post in Angra do Heroísmo to Director-General of the PIDE (n° 55/59/S.R.), March 23, 1959,

ANTT, PIDE/DGS, DP, Angra do Heroísmo, 21, Correspondência confidencial—expedida, NP 299(3).

55. Boswell, *Report*, November 13, 1950, Box 3718: 4.

56. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 3/55-S.R.), July 30, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: *passim*.

57. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 1–2.

58. In spite of unfriendly political police reports on his person coming from Angra do Heroísmo, Carvalho Malheiro (while not having any spectacular career) lived comparatively undisturbed and remained in a responsible position throughout the 1960s and 1970s, until the early 1980s. Information on his further career under the *Estado Novo* can be found in ANTT, SGPCM, GMC/001/37/5172.

59. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 2.

60. On Malheiro's future activities as a kind of "villain" and political opposition leader in São Jorge, see V. Cunha to Director-General of the PIDE (n° 270/59), October 30, 1959, ANTT, PIDE/DGS, DP, Angra do Heroísmo, 21, Correspondência confidencial—expedida, NP 299 (3): 2–3.

61. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 2/55-S.R.), May 10, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 2–3.

62. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/56-S.V.F.), May 12, 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 1.

63. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/56-S.V.F.), May 12, 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 3.

64. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 2/56-S.R.), June 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 1.

65. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 2/56-S.R.), June 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 3.

66. A source of friction between the US command and the Portuguese administration in Terceira were complaints by Portuguese employees of the base seeing their rights violated. In 1957, the Labour Court in Angra do Heroísmo accepted the claims of Portuguese citizens working at the American base as firemen and opened a lawsuit against the government of the United States. The Portuguese army commander being informed, this procedure was stopped by the Air Ministry in Lisbon; a new judge in 1958 confirmed that his predecessor had taken hasty and unnecessary action. The episode shows that the understanding between Portuguese and US army officials was strong—and it is in itself notable that the PIDE delegation was not involved in the proceedings. See American Consul in the Azores to State Department in Washington (n° 15/753b.56311/9-136), September 13, 1960, NARA, DSDP, RG 59, Box 1818.

67. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 2/54-S.R.), July 3, 1954, RPE-C, NP 304.

68. Mackay, *Some Characteristics*, April 18, 1960, Box 1818: 2.

69. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 3/54-S.R.), July 3, 1954, RPE-C, NP 304.

70. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 4.

71. J. Lourenço, to Director-General of the PIDE (n° 159/55-S.R.), August 22, 1955, ANTT, PIDE/DGS, DP, Angra do Heroísmo, 21, Correspondência confidencial—expedida, NP 299(1).

72. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 82/54-S.V.F.), December 18, 1954, Correspondência confidencial, NP 299(1).

73. Another cooperation that escaped the control attempts of the political police was that between US medical officers and civilian doctors on Terceira, the latter being freely consulted for treatment of US staff and their families. See G. B. Dany, Brigadier General,

US Airforce in the Azores, to C. Burke Elbrick, US Ambassador in Lisbon (J11/RDS:b1/12750), May 23, 1960, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 1818: 1.

74. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 2/55-S.R.), May 10, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 1–2.

75. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/56-S.V.F.), May 12, 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 1–2.

76. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/56-S.V.F.), May 12, 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 2.

77. Mackay, *Some Characteristics*, April 18, 1960, Box 1818: 5; Airgram from US Consul in Ponta Delgada to Department of State, *Storm Damages Breakwater in Praia da Victoria Harbor near Lajes, Azores*. (n° 753b.56311/1-863), January 8, 1963, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 1818; Marcelo Bettencourt, Director-Engineer of Public Works, *Relatório circunstanciado sobre a extensão dos estragos causados na Ilha de São Jorge pela recente actividade sísmica nos Açores—Plano de reconstrução da ilha e sua execução* (without number), March 2, 1964, Biblioteca Pública e Arquivo de Angra do Heroísmo, Governo Civil do Distrito de Angra de Heroísmo, Processos Diversos (SR), 1961–1971.

78. On the use of US dollars as second (or first) currency in the island, see V. Cunha, PIDE Commander in Angra do Heroísmo, to Director-General of the PIDE (n° 153/57), August 14, 1957, ANTT, PIDE/DGS, Delegações e Postos, Angra do Heroísmo, 21, Correspondência confidencial - expedida, NP 299(2).

79. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 2/56-S.R.), June 1956, RPE-C, NP 304: 1.

80. See, for example, “Pontos a considerar,” *Diário Insular* (Angra do Heroísmo), March 29, 1960, commented by the American consulate in Henry E. Mattox, American Vice-Consul in Ponta Delgada, *Azores Newspaper Decries Influence of American Base on Island Life* (n° 753b.56311/5-660), May 6, 1960, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 1818.

81. By 1956, this jurisdiction even included American civilians and employees of the base—this situation only changed with a US Supreme Court decision in 1960, see COMUSFORAZ, *Authority to Remove U.S. Civilian Personnel from the Azores*. (n° J11/RDS:b1/12750), March 30, 1960, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 1818.

82. Lourenço to Director-General (n° 1/55-S.R.), January 25, 1955, RPE-C, NP 304: 4–5.

83. It is telling that by 1960, the US military command considered the close relations of COMUSFORAZ with the regular police, the district attorney, the director of immigration, and the director of customs to be much more important than those with the PIDE command; see Mackay, *Some Characteristics*, April 18, 1960, Box 1818: 3.

84. Frank Micelotti, American Vice-Consul, *Memorandum of Conversation—Civil Governor of District of Angra, Azores, Deplores Attack on Embassy, Lisbon* (without number), April 25, 1961, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 1818. On the negative vision of the new civil governor by PIDE officials, see also V. Cunha, Commander of PIDE Post in Angra do Heroísmo, to Director-General of the PIDE (n° 55/59/S.R.), March 23, 1959, ANTT, PIDE/DGS, DP, Angra do Heroísmo, 21, Correspondência confidencial—expedida, NP 299(3): 1.

85. Acting Post Commander of the PIDE in Angra do Heroísmo to Director-General of the PIDE (n° 2/61-4^a.DIV.), December 9, 1961, ANTT, PIDE/DGS, DP, Angra do Heroísmo, 23, RPE-C, NP 304: 2.

86. On the link between US interests in the Azores and (unsuccessful) Portuguese pressures to change US positions with regard to the war in Angola, see Chester Bowles to Kennedy, *The Azores* (without number), June 4, 1962, NARA, DSDF, RG 59, Box 1818.

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